When a Gold Mine Turns Political: What Barrick v. Mali Tells Us About the Fragile Balance Between Sovereignty and Investor Rights

📖 Reading time: 7 minutes

In mid-June 2025, something unusual happened in West Africa. A national court—in Bamako, Mali—effectively took over a major foreign-owned gold mine. Just like that.

The Loulo–Gounkoto complex, one of Mali’s most productive and lucrative mining operations, was placed under provisional judicial administration. A former finance minister, Zoumana Makadji, was appointed to oversee the site for six months. The mine had been operated by Canadian mining giant Barrick Gold for over two decades. But as of June 16, it was, legally speaking, no longer in their hands (AP News, 2025).

The reason? Officially, tax disputes. Unpaid dues, allegations of financial irregularities, and a broader shift in the country’s approach to resource governance. But beneath those justifications lies something more telling—something about the relationship between global capital and state sovereignty. About how far a country can go to assert control over its own resources without violating the rights of foreign investors. And, in a broader sense, about the limits of international law in moments of political recalibration.

This is where ICSID arbitration enters the story. And with it, a host of unresolved tensions that this case now forces into the spotlight.

A Mine, a Nation, a Fracture

To appreciate how we got here, it helps to understand the significance of this particular mine.

Loulo–Gounkoto isn’t just another site on Barrick’s portfolio map. It accounts for roughly 14% of the company’s total gold output and generates over a billion US dollars in annual revenue (Financial Times, 2025). It’s also a cornerstone of Mali’s export economy—a nation where gold is, quite literally, the golden goose.

The relationship had, for years, been largely symbiotic. Barrick provided capital, technology, and employment. Mali, in return, offered relatively stable regulatory terms through a series of “Mining Conventions”—essentially investment agreements with treaty-like protections. But like many arrangements between resource-rich countries and multinational corporations, the balance was always delicate. And, some might say, overdue for a reckoning.

That reckoning began in earnest in late 2024, when Mali revised its mining code. This was part of a broader effort, the government said, to secure a greater share of national wealth from its extractive industries. Shortly after, customs authorities seized over three metric tonnes of refined gold—worth hundreds of millions of dollars—from Barrick, citing unpaid taxes (Reuters, 2024). Export bans followed. Arrest warrants were issued. Employees were detained. And by January 2025, Barrick had suspended operations entirely (Reuters, 2025a).

By May, with diplomatic channels exhausted and the situation spiraling, the company filed for arbitration under the World Bank’s International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes—ICSID. Alongside the main claim, it submitted a request for provisional measures: an urgent appeal to halt further state interference, citing risks of irreparable harm (Reuters, 2025c).

Then came the June court order. For Barrick, this wasn’t just a legal maneuver. It was, effectively, the state taking over the mine.

The Legal Terrain: Between Protection and Power

Investor-state arbitration cases are not new. Nor are disputes over taxation or local regulatory reforms. What makes Barrick v. Mali remarkable is the sharpness of the state’s actions—and how openly they challenge the architecture of investor protections enshrined in international agreements.

At the heart of Barrick’s claim are the same legal protections found in most modern investment treaties: fair and equitable treatment (FET), safeguards against indirect expropriation, and the right to international arbitration under ICSID. These protections don’t require host countries to freeze their laws. But they do demand a certain kind of restraint—particularly when a state’s actions substantially deprive a foreign investor of control or benefit from their investment.

So what, exactly, constitutes “expropriation”? That’s the slippery part.

There’s a long line of ICSID cases—Tecmed v. Mexico, LG&E v. Argentina, Quiborax v. Bolivia—where tribunals have found that measures taken under the banner of regulation crossed the line into de facto expropriation. Not because they were illegal per se, but because of their effect on the investor’s rights (Tecmed v. Mexico, ARB(AF)/00/2; Quiborax, ARB/06/2).

In Barrick’s case, the argument is straightforward: Mali’s actions—detaining employees, seizing assets, and transferring operational control—amount to more than taxation enforcement. They effectively gut the value of the investment. And they do so in a way that prejudices the arbitration process itself, making provisional relief not only appropriate but essential.

Provisional Measures: Urgent, Binding, and… Maybe Toothless?

The ICSID Convention (Article 47) and Arbitration Rules (notably Rule 39 of the 2006 Rules) allow tribunals to issue provisional measures—interim protections designed to preserve rights while a case is ongoing. These aren’t suggestions. They’re binding within the ICSID system. But here’s the rub: they’re not directly enforceable in national courts.

Which means that, in practice, their power depends on a mix of legal theory, reputational pressure, and political will. If a state like Mali chooses to ignore provisional orders, the immediate consequences are minimal—at least legally. Enforcement would come later, if at all, and through other channels (City Oriente v. Ecuador, ARB/06/21).

Still, in some cases, provisional measures serve as a meaningful brake on escalation. In Plama v. Bulgaria and Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, for instance, tribunals used them to shield investors from criminal actions and preserve procedural fairness during proceedings (Plama v. Bulgaria, ARB/03/24; Biwater v. Tanzania, ARB/05/22).

For Barrick, then, the success of its request may hinge not just on legal thresholds—urgency, irreparability, non-prejudice—but on whether the tribunal believes the integrity of the process is at real risk.

And if it does? That might buy the company time. But not necessarily compliance.

Sovereignty Isn’t Just Legal—it’s Emotional

It’s tempting to cast this as a battle between law and lawlessness. But that would miss the complexity of what’s actually unfolding.

From Mali’s perspective, this is about asserting control over national resources and recalibrating what it sees as imbalanced economic relationships. After all, gold mining is not merely a revenue stream; it’s a symbol of national dignity and autonomy.

There’s also a growing chorus across parts of Africa advocating for a post-colonial restructuring of investment norms. That’s not to excuse overreach or heavy-handed tactics. But it does help explain why Mali might be willing to risk an ICSID award.

And history suggests that, even when states lose such cases, enforcement is patchy at best. Awards may be legally binding, but states often invoke sovereign immunity to block collection efforts—especially if assets are located domestically (see Article 55 of the ICSID Convention). In practical terms, enforcement requires either attachable state assets abroad or political leverage—both of which are unevenly distributed.

So What’s at Stake?

Plenty.

For Barrick, this is about preserving a multi-billion-dollar asset and limiting reputational damage. For Mali, it’s a test of how far a state can push back against treaty commitments in the name of national interest. And for the broader investment community, it’s a litmus test of ICSID’s continued relevance in a shifting geopolitical climate.

If Barrick wins and Mali complies, it will reinforce the idea that investor-state arbitration remains a robust, enforceable system—even in turbulent jurisdictions.

If Mali resists or delays compliance? That sends a very different message. One that may chill investment, yes—but also embolden states rethinking the terms of their extractive relationships.

Either way, the implications are far-reaching.

This case could shape how future treaties are drafted—perhaps with clearer carve-outs for regulatory action, or tighter rules on interim measures. It may influence how companies assess political risk in mining hotspots. And it could feed into ongoing debates about whether ICSID, and ISDS more broadly, still serve their intended purpose in a world increasingly skeptical of supranational legal regimes.

A Final, Slightly Uncomfortable Thought

It’s easy, perhaps too easy, to root for the rule of law. For legal predictability. For the protections that allow cross-border investment to function.

But sovereignty, especially in post-colonial states, is not just a legal category. It’s a lived, deeply felt imperative. And when a court in Bamako hands a Canadian company’s mine over to a former finance minister, we are not only witnessing a legal dispute. We’re witnessing a power struggle—with its own logic, rhythms, and historical weight.

Will the law win? Maybe. Maybe not.

But either way, this isn’t just about Barrick or gold or arbitration clauses. It’s about the tension at the heart of globalization: between a borderless economy and a world still organized, for better or worse, around the state.

References

• AP News (2025) ‘Mali takes control of Canadian-owned Barrick Gold mine over tax dispute’, Associated Press, 16 June. Available at (Accessed: 17 June 2025).

• Barrick Gold Corporation (2025) ‘Barrick Holding Firm Through ICSID Arbitration Amid Malian Court Ruling’, Press Release, 16 June. Available at (Accessed: 17 June 2025).

• Financial Times (2025) ‘Mali court deals blow to Barrick Mining in dispute over gold project’, Financial Times, 16 June. Available at (Accessed: 17 June 2025).

• Reuters (2024) ‘Barrick Gold seeks arbitration over Mali gold mine dispute’, Reuters, 18 December. Available at (Accessed: 17 June 2025).

• Reuters (2025a) ‘Barrick Mining’s gold complex placed under state control in Mali’, Reuters, 16 June. Available at (Accessed: 17 June 2025).

• Reuters (2025b) ‘Barrick Mining removes Mali gold complex from 2025 output forecast, sources say’, Reuters, 11 June. Available at (Accessed: 17 June 2025).

• Reuters (2025c) ‘Barrick asks World Bank court to intervene in Mali proceedings’, Reuters, 29 May. Available at (Accessed: 17 June 2025).